Catholic University Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 4 Summer 1991

Article 6

1991

Out Like Yesterday's Garbage: Municipal Solid Waste and the
Need for Congressional Action
Michael R. Harpring

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Michael R. Harpring, Out Like Yesterday's Garbage: Municipal Solid Waste and the Need for Congressional
Action, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 851 (1991).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss4/6

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

COMMENT
OUT LIKE YESTERDAY'S GARBAGE:
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE AND THE
NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
Across the United States a problem has been growing for decades. The
problem is garbage. Municipal solid waste (MSW)' is generated today at
1. MSW is derived from solid waste. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988), defines solid waste as
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does
not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges ... , special nuclear, or
byproduct material.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27); see also 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1990) (setting forth a more specific definition). By definition, RCRA does not regulate all types of solid waste. For example, the Clean
Water Act regulates domestic sewage, industrial wastewaters, and irrigation return flows that
are point sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). Nuclear wastes are covered by the Atomic Energy
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988). Several other wastes are specifically excluded from the solid
waste definition. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4.
MSW is "normally, residential and commercial solid wastes generated within a community." 40 C.F.R. § 240.101(q) (1990). General household wastes are specifically excluded
from the classification of hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. at § 261.4(b)(1). More specifically,
MSW
includes wastes such as durable goods, nondurable goods, containers and packaging,
food wastes, yard wastes, and miscellaneous inorganic wastes from residential, commercial, institutional, and industrial sources. Examples of waste from these categories include appliances, newspapers, clothing, food scraps, boxes, disposable
tableware, office and classroom paper, wood pallets, and cafeteria wastes. MSW does
not include wastes from other sources, such as municipal sludges, combustion ash,
and industrial nonhazardous process wastes that might also be disposed of in municipal waste landfills or incinerators.
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/530-SW-90042A, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 UPDATE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES-2 (1990) [hereinafter EPA, MSW 1990 UPDATE]. Solid
waste and MSW are not to be confused with hazardous waste, which is defined as

a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
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unprecedented rates, 2 while landfills are closing faster than ever.' The problem is especially pronounced in the industrialized states and municipalities,
which are the first to run short of disposal capacity. 4 Because of their diminished landfill space, many states export waste to distant disposal sites
throughout the nation. 5 Congress has confronted this waste disposal problem by enacting legislation that regulates some aspects of waste disposal,6
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classifies a
waste as hazardous after first determining whether it is a solid waste. It then deems the waste
hazardous by using one of two methods. The EPA can specifically identify and list the solid
waste as a hazardous waste, 42 U.S.C. § 6921; 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-.33, or it can show that the
waste possesses one of four characteristics: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity or toxicity. 42
U.S.C. § 6921; 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-24.
2. According to the EPA:
Generation of municipal solid waste grew steadily between 1960 and 1988, from 88
million to nearly 180 million tons per year. Per capita generation of MSW increased
from 2.7 pounds per person per day in 1960 to 4.0 pounds per person per day in
1988. Between 1986 and 1988, generation increased from 3.8 to 4.0 pounds per person per day (167 million to 180 million tons per year). By 2000, projected per capita
MSW generation is 4.4 pounds per person per day (216 million tons). Projected
MSW generation in the year 2010 is over 250 million tons, or 4.9 pounds per person
per day.
EPA, MSW 1990 UPDATE, supra note 1, at ES-9, ES-13 (emphasis in original).
3. According to the EPA, as the rate of waste generation is increasing, the capacity to
dispose of the waste is decreasing. By 1991, one-third of America's landfills will be full. This
will increase pressure on those remaining to continue to accept waste. MUNICIPAL SOLID
WASTE TASK FORCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/530-SW-89-019,
THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 8 (1989) [hereinafter EPA, SOLID
WASTE DILEMMA]; Mariette DiChristina, How We Can Win the War Against Garbage, POPuLAR SCI., Oct. 1990, at 57.
4. "The problem is acute in the densely populated states of the Northeast." Jon R.
Luoma, Trash Can Realities, AUDUBON, Mar. 1990, at 86, 88. In Connecticut, state officials
claim that almost all landfills will reach capacity by 1992. In New Jersey, the number of
landfills has decreased from 300 in 1976 to 100 in 1990 with 90 percent of the in-state disposal
going to only twelve. New York landfills have fallen from 500 in 1982 to 270 in 1990, with
those remaining predicted to be full by 1995. Id.
5. New York state, for example, ships some of its waste to Oklahoma. DiChristina,
supra note 3, at 63.
6. The Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) (as amended by RCRA) regulates the area of
hazardous waste from generation to disposal. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). RCRA identifies and lists hazardous wastes in the United States. Id. at § 6921. It sets out mandatory
regulations governing the generation, transportation, disposal and post-disposal treatment of
hazardous wastes. Id. at §§ 6922-6939b. These regulations impose detailed and extensive record-keeping and labeling requirements. Id. at §§ 6924(r), (s).
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
regulates the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA
imposes joint and several liability on generators and transporters of hazardous wastes that are
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but has limited its attention to regulating hazardous waste and has given
MSW only a passing glance. 7
Because the disposal problem persists and comprehensive response has
been limited, the states have attempted to step into the regulatory vacuum
left by Congress. Although several states have enacted their own legislation
to control the interstate disposal of MSW,5 the states' ability to react is limited and inadequate. 9 The Commerce Clause of the Constitution ° and the
Supreme Court's 1978 City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey" decision protect
the interstate transportation of MSW from discrimination based solely on
released into the environment. It also imposes liability on the owners and operators of dumpsites. Id. at § 9607.
7. William L. Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid
Waste Disposal Services-Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 ENv-rL.
L. 779, 782 (1988) (explaining that the only power the federal government has over MSW is
the withdrawal of funding and technical assistance for approved MSW management plans, but
that because funding has been scarce in recent years, Congress' effective authority is small).
Congress' financial assistance to states for MSW management consistently has been "meager" compared to funding for hazardous waste management. In 1980, approximately $32 million was spent on controlling MSW while over $65.5 million was spent on regulating
hazardous waste. By 1986, MSW funding had declined to just under $3 million, while the
amount spent to regulate hazardous waste climbed to over $140 million. Id. at 782 n.15.
8. See generally Jim Glenn, The State of Garbage in America, BIOCYCLE, Apr. 1990, at
34. Most states have enacted some type overall regulations covering the operation of MSW
landfills. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,320-21 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258); see also.
e.g., Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind.
1990) (examining Indiana legislation requiring out-of-state MSW haulers to satisfy certification requirements and fee schedules before being permitted to dump within the state); Bill
Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (holding that Michigan law required out-of-state MSW haulers to get approval
from the receiving county's solid waste management plan), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 630
U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-636).
9. Many states have passed regulations controlling the operation and closure of MSW
landfills. These regulations are not uniform across the nation and, according to the EPA, may
not be adequate to protect the health and safety of residents in some areas of the country.
Through an EPA study on state operated RCRA programs and a detailed review of state
regulations in 1984, the Agency discovered several important facts concerning the present
MSW disposal problem. 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,320. First, even though most states imposed some
regulations governing the overall operation of the facility, the rules vary greatly across the
country. Id. Second, state MSW landfill siting restrictions also vary greatly from state to
state. Id. For example, restrictions concerning the siting of landfills near habitable residences
ranged from 200 feet to three-quarters of a mile and required distances from community water
sources that ranged from 400 feet to one mile. Id. Finally, groundwater and methane monitoring, corrective action, and post-closure maintenance requirements vary similarly nationwide. Id. at 33,320-21. In sum, the EPA found that "there are certain gaps in some State and
Territorial regulatory programs, which may result in inadequate protection of human health
and the environment in some parts of the country." Id. at 33,321.
10. U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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the waste's point of origin.12 Accordingly, some state attempts to restrict
out-of-state dumpers from using in-state facilities have failed. 13 Even so,
other states have been successful at keeping out-of-state waste from entering
their borders. 14

Because of the states' inability to regulate MSW disposal, Congress must
take a more active role in solving the MSW disposal problem. Congress
should create comprehensive federal regulations to ensure safety and uniformity in MSW disposal. For waste that must be disposed of in out-of-state
landfills, Congress should permit the states to work together through interstate compacts to collectively control interstate dumping and should allow
for federal disposal regulations to ensure national uniformity. The most efficient way to implement national regulations and to encourage states to open
their borders to out-of-state MSW is to allow states to pool their resources
and confront the problem together. The ultimate goal reached through interstate compacts and national regulations would be decreased generation
and proper disposal of trash on a nationwide basis.15
This Comment calls for federal leadership and state cooperation to solve
the growing danger of MSW disposal. After reviewing the MSW disposal
problem, this Comment discusses the action and inaction of the federal government regarding waste disposal. Because interstate MSW disposal is "interstate commerce," this Comment next analyzes the history of the
Commerce Clause and how its construction and application has affected the
interstate transport of refuse, including the effect of the Commerce Clause
on the states' most recent attempts to block the importation of out-of-state
waste. Finally, this Comment recommends a joint effort between the states
and Congress to resolve the MSW problem. Congress should enact comprehensive federal regulations to give the states guidance, and the states should
12. The Court in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey held that a New Jersey ban on the
importation of most solid and liquid waste into the state violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at
627-28.
13. See, e.g., Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739
(S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding in violation of the commerce clause waste certification regulations
that imposed stricter requirements on waste importers and a variable dumping fee schedule
that charged importers the same rate as what they would have paid in the state of the waste's
origin); see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); text accompanying infra note
152.
14. Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987) (holding state ban on
dumping out-of-state garbage in the state's only landfill did not violate the commerce clause,
although the practical effect of the ban was to shut the borders on imported MSW).
15. The EPA recommends using "integrated waste management" systems consisting of
source reduction, recycling, combustion, and landfilling to solve waste generation and management problems at the local, regional and national levels. EPA, SOLID WASTE DILEMMA,
supra note 3, at 16; see also DiChristina, supra note 3, at 58.
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create interstate compacts to pool their resources to resolve the interstate
disposal problem. One thing appears certain: this problem will not simply
vanish like yesterday's garbage.
I.

THE PROBLEM: SO MUCH TRASH AND NOWHERE TO PUT IT

The United States generates 180 million tons of MSW per year.16 This

amounts to four pounds of garbage for every man, woman, and child each
day. 7 Some of this waste is recycled"8 and some is incinerated, 19 but the
vast majority of MSW is dumped into landfills across the country.2"
Despite the popularity of landfill dumping, there are serious health risks
associated with this practice. Landfills usually are unsightly and malodor16. See supra note 2 (quoting EPA, 1990 MSW UPDATE, supra note 1 at ES-9, E-13).
Paper products make up 41 percent of the waste stream; yard wastes, 18 percent; and other
wastes including metals, glass, food, waste and plastics the remainder. Much of this waste
stems from America's love of disposable products and packaging. EPA, SOLID WASTE DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 6-7.
17. See supra note 2 (quoting EPA, 1990 MSW UPDATE, supra note 1, at ES-9, ES-13).
18. The United States recycled 13 percent of its MSW in 1988. EPA, MSW 1990 UPDATE, supra note 1, at ES-4. "[The] amount [recovered] varied significantly according to the
type of waste. For example, nearly 26 percent of waste paper was recovered in 1988, while less
than 2 percent of plastic wastes were recovered." Id. (citation omitted). On the local level,
more ambitious and successful recycling programs are in use. Marin County, California recycles 22 percent of its municipal solid waste; Wilton, New Hampshire diverts and reclaims 44
percent. However, recycling programs in the United States have met with mixed success. Unless some type of incentive system is provided, long-term participation in such programs tends
to wane. Even though these programs are considered successful, the recycling potential of
these areas is far from realized, as more than 75 percent of the United States' MSW is recyclable. Philip R. O'Leary et al., ManagingSolid Waste, ScI. AM., Dec. 1988, at 36, 38; see also
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/530-SW-89014, RECYCLING WORKS!: STATE AND LOCAL SOLUTIONS TO SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
PROBLEMS 3-6 (1989).
19. Fourteen percent of the United States' MSW was incinerated in 1988. EPA, MSW
1990 UPDATE, supra note 1, at ES-13. The purpose of incineration is to reduce the volume of
solid waste to be buried in landfills. O'Leary, supra note 18, at 39. "Incinerators drastically
Faye
shrink the garbage delivered to them -up to 90% by volume and 75% by weight ....
Rice, Where Will We Put All That Garbage?, FORTUNE, Apr. 11, 1988, at 96, 98. Incinerator
programs across the country, however, have met with stiff opposition because of the environmental drawbacks to burning garbage. For example, if the fire is not kept at a high enough
temperature, solvents and plastics can release carcinogenic chemicals called dioxins into the
atmosphere. Additionally, the ash that is left over after incineration can be as toxic as hazardous waste, requiring the same precautions be taken regarding its disposal. See id. at 98-100.
20. According to the EPA, the demand for landfill space fluctuates according to changes
in alternative waste management methods. When both incineration and waste recovery rates
decline, more MSW is disposed of in landfills. In 1960, 62 percent of America's MSW was sent
to landfills; in 1980, 81 percent; and in 1988, 73 percent. EPA, MSW 1990 UPDATE, supra
note 1, at ES-13.
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Landfills often exude chemicals that pollute the ground water.

22

They release methane gas, a by-product of decomposing garbage, which can,
if left uncaptured, travel through the ground into nearby homes and buildings and create the potential for explosion. 23 Finally, MSW landfills can
become toxic to the point of being subject to federal hazardous waste
regulations.24
21. Efforts to site new landfills are often opposed by citizens who are worried about "nuisance factors [such] as noise, smells, and truck traffic" and about the effect the landfill will
have on property values. EPA, SOLID WASTE DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 14.
22. As experts in the field of waste management describe the problem:
When water from rain or from the waste itself permeates the landfill, the water is
initially rendered acidic by biochemical processes. The acidic water percolates
through the waste, dissolving elements and compounds from the waste to form a
highly contaminated solution known as leachate. Later in the lifetime of the landfill,
alkaline conditions develop that continue to produce leachate. If a landfill's capacity
to hold water is exceeded, leachate escapes into the environment in unpredictable
quantities, concentrations and directions. Surrounding surface waters, aquifers and
entire ecosystems are often contaminated and damaged by leachate.
O'Leary, supra note 18, at 40-41.
New York State claims that the Fresh Kill landfill, located on Staten Island, leaks 2,000,000
gallons of leachate a day into surrounding groundwater. Melinda Beck, Buried Alive, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 27, 1989, at 66. Leachate can be controlled by proper planning and construction
of landfills with leachate collection systems. A leachate collection system consists of installing
a nonpermeable liner of clay or synthetic material into the bottom of the landfill, thereby
creating a "leachate bathtub." As the liquid collects above the liner it is pumped out through a
series of pipes that run over the top edge of the liner wall. The leachate is then stored in tanks
where it awaits shipping to other disposal or sewage treatment facilities. O'Leary, supra note
18, at 41-42.
An EPA study of 163 MSW landfills reported groundwater contamination at 146 sites and
surface water contamination at 73 other sites. When a landfill leaks, there is nothing to contain the contaminants and prevent them from migrating beyond the physical boundary lines of
the immediate site. Groundwater contaminant plumes extended into aquifers down to 70 feet
at two sites and to nearly 300 feet at another site. The EPA found that one contaminant plume
migrated one-half mile downgradient of the landfill, while another plume migrated almost one
and one-half miles downgradient. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314,
33,319 (1988).
23. Methane, an explosive gas at sufficient concentrations, is produced in MSW landfills
through the process of anaerobic decomposition of organic waste. 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,319. In a
study of 29 damage cases, methane was found in explosive concentrations 1000 feet from the
landfill in 23 cases. Explosions and fires occurred in 20 of the 29 cases, loss of life in 5, and
injuries in several others. Id.
24. The EPA's 1986 MSW landfill study listed landfills on the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL), which is the EPA's list of sites most in need of cleanup. Of the 850 sites listed
or proposed, 184 (22 percent) are MSW landfills. In addition, "of the 27,000 sites in the
Superfund data base, almost one fourth are [MSW landfills]." Id. The MSW landfills listed
generally are improperly located and designed. Because these sites began operating prior to
the enactment of national hazardous waste regulation in 1980, they are likely to contain hazardous as well as non-hazardous waste. Newer MSW landfills are safer in both their construction and operation; however, 70 percent of existing MSW landfills began operating prior to
enactment of the 1980 regulation. Id.; see also Luoma, supra note 4, at 88.
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In addition, America's capacity to dispose of its MSW in landfills is
quickly diminishing. Within two years, one third of the landfills presently
operating will close.2 5 Within the next twenty years, 80 percent will shut
down.2 6 Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult for government officials to site new landfills because of mounting public opposition and lack of
proper geological conditions.2 7

As the amount of landfill space decreases, the cost of waste disposal increases.2" Ultimately, as the cost of local disposal becomes prohibitive, it
becomes economical to transport the refuse to other states where the costs of

dumping are much lower.2 9 The increasing cost of MSW disposal is turning
In addition, certain types of hazardous wastes continue to find their way into MSW landfills.
"Hazardous wastes, as defined by Federal and State regulation, generally are managed outside
the municipal solid waste stream. Exceptions are household hazardous wastes and hazardous
wastes generated in very small quantities, which are often placed in the municipal solid waste
stream by the generator." EPA, SOLID WASTE DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 6; see also H.R.
2767, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (bill by Rep. Smith of New Jersey) (removing liability of a
"municipality or other person" for the generation or transportation of MSW).
25. DiChristina, supra note 3, at 57.
26. Id.
27. The MSW disposal problem is aggravated not only by the increased rates of landfill
closings, but also by the difficulty in opening new facilities. Efforts to site new landfills are
meeting strong resistance from members of the public who fear contaminated ground water
and decreased property values. EPA, SOLID WASTE DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 14-15.
The EPA was sufficiently concerned with the siting of new MSW disposal facilities that it
issued a 110-page guidebook aimed at helping government officials choose sites which will win
public approval. OFFcE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No.
EPA/530-SW-90-019, SITES FOR OUR SOLID WASTE: A GUIDEBOOK FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT (1990).
Even if a state or municipality gains public approval for a proposed site, the geological
conditions of the native soil may not be appropriate for use as a landfill:
[A]reas with sandy or porous soils are unsuitable for siting new landfills. To avoid
this problem, landfills should be placed in areas in which the soil contains natural
liners, such as clay, or artificial plastic liners. The first option restricts the availability of suitable landfill sites, while the second option significantly increases the costs of
operating one.
Sherry C. Furr, Note, Environmental Law-Conservation. New Jersey Mandatory Statewide
Source Separation and Recycling of Solid Waste Act, 11 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 733, 735
(1988-89) (footnotes omitted).
28. As the EPA has stated:
When local officials are asked to list the chief problems associated with municipal
solid waste, they usually cite the growing shortage of landfill capacity and the high
cost of managing waste. These two management problems are especially severe in
some American cities, where disposal costs have soared to more than $100 per ton of
waste ....
EPA, SOLID WASTE DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 12; see also infra note 29.
29. For example, Fresh Kills landfill on New York's Staten Island charges $125 per ton to
dump MSW. The typical rate in Indiana is $12 per ton. The cost of transportation between
the two sites is $33 to $35 per ton. Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh
753 F. Supp. 739, 748 (S.D. Ind. 1990). New Jersey now ships one-half of its solid waste out-
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landfill operation into big business."a Further, the quickly evolving disposal
market has created a new player, the trash broker, who earns a living by
simply arranging contracts between refuse transfer and recycling stations
and distant out-of-state landfill operators.3"
The most common trend is a MSW migration from the Northeast region
of the United States to the Midwest.32 Because of this waste transfer, importing states' landfills reach capacity faster than expected, and state and
local waste management plans are upset.3 a Importing states are increasingly
concerned about both the composition and quantity of the waste. 34 Before it
reaches its final destination, exported waste often changes hands several
35
times and at each stage gets mixed with refuse from many other sources.
of-state. William E. Schmidt, The Midwest Tries to Slow the Flow of Eastern Trash, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, § 4, at 4.
30. Sanifill, a new company, operates landfills for nonhazardous wastes. On April 12,
1990, it sold 2 million shares to the public at $9 1/2. By the end of that day, the value of the
stock rose to $12 3/8. One market analyst believes Sanifill's stock will rise up to the $30 to $32
range within the next two years. Eric Hoffman, Lining Up Fora Landfill Play, Bus. WK., Apr.
30, 1990, at 105. Similarly, the stock of two other waste-disposal companies, Chamber Development and Allwaste, have increased in value by a factor of ten in the last four years. Id.
31. As Federal District Judge Tinder of the Southern District of Indiana noted:
The revenue obtained by trash-brokering results from putting the disposal deal together rather than performing any part of the disposal transaction. Thus, [trash brokers] do not haul the trash themselves nor do they own the vehicles in which it is
hauled. Typically, they arrange verbally to have haulers pick up trash at particular
municipal solid waste and recycling stations in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania after having arranged for the dumping of this waste in Midwestern landfills.
Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 748.
32. See, e.g., id. at 777 (noting that "almost all trash coming into Indiana originates on
the East Coast"); Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Transportationand Hazardous Materialsof
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1991) (statement of
Rep. McCurdy) (explaining how the transfer destination of MSW is extending to Indiana,
Virginia, Kentucky, and Oklahoma) [hereinafter Hearings].
33. Representative McCurdy (D-OK) emphasized that one company attempted to gain
permission to build a waste transfer station in order to import 500,000 pounds of MSW into
Oklahoma City, which would cut the city's landfill capacity to satisfy local demand in half.
Hearings,supra note 32, at 18. Discussing the possibility of accepting waste from a neighboring county whose local dumpsite is closing, the chairman of the Prince William County, Virginia, board of supervisors said, "We spent a long time siting the landfill so that we could
extend its life ....We're not going to cut it in half by accepting trash from Fairfax County
.....
" Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Christine Spolar, Trash Costs Said to Soar $15 Million, WASH.
PosT, Mar. 20, 1991, at DI, D4 (second omission in original).
34. When different types of wastes are mixed together, a variety of chemical mixtures and
reactions are possible; therefore, waste disposal methods must be developed accordingly. See
O'Leary, supra note 17, at 37. "Dumping mixed wastes that include potential water pollutants
in horribly designed landfills is a costly mistake." Luoma, supra note 4, at 88.
35. As District Judge Tinder pointed out in Government Suppliers, "[a] transfer station is
used for the collection of solid waste from a variety of sources. The waste is delivered to the
station by the curbside collectors where it is consolidated from smaller vehicles into a larger
one for hauling to a disposal site." Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 750.
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Thus, it is difficult for an importing state to know the types of wastes and
hazards it is burying within its borders.36 As a result of this increased
dumping, interest groups are voicing their disapproval to local, state, and
federal governments."

The issue is extremely emotional and has become the

center of some election campaigns. 3' The solid waste issue has also generated resentment among states.3 9
The ultimate solution to the MSW disposal problem will come from a
comprehensive waste management plan which will incorporate four interrelated components: source reduction, recycling, incineration, and landfilling.' No matter how effective the United States is at implementing the rest
[A]lmost all trash coming into Indiana . . . passes through a recycling or transfer
station prior to being loaded onto a semi-trailer for shipment to the Midwest. Transfer stations are located throughout the East Coast and receive and commingle trash
from many states. As a result, haulers who transport trash from an East Coast transfer station to Indiana can trace the trash back only to the transfer station.
Id at 777.
36. Inspection of baled MSW is difficult and unpleasant work.
For... an [on-site] inspection to be conducted, heavy equipment would be needed to
push the compacted trash apart, so that a visual examination of the trash could be
made.... Various [Indiana Department of Environmental Management] employees
expressed their reluctance to conduct trash load inspections at landfills because of the
hazards and discomfort of such inspections.
Id. at 750.
37. Hoosiers Opposing Pollution of the Environment (HOPE), a citizens' action group,
positioned volunteers along the roads leading to a Clay County, Indiana landfill and tallied the
number of trucks headed toward the site. HOPE documented 5,500 trucks headed for the
single landfill, many of which came from out-of-state. Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at
748. HOPE strenuously lobbied the Indiana General Assembly, the Governor, and Congress
in opposition to the influx of imported wastes into Indiana. Id. Representative Olin (D-VA)
introduced H.R. 173, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), authorizing states to restrict the interstate
transportation of MSW. The bill was introduced partially in response to citizen outcry surrounding the events of the Kim-Stan landfill in Selma, Virginia, in which an out-of-state party
purchased the local landfill and increased the amount of MSW dumping from three to four
trucks a day to as many as 120 per day. Hearings, supra note 32, 21-23 (statement of Rep.
Olin). Citizens complained about odor, insects, blowing trash, vehicle traffic, and late operating hours. The landfill was ultimately closed due to pollution of state waters. Id.
38. For example, in his 1990 Senatorial campaign, Indiana Republican Dan Coats ran a
television advertisement which "depicted a fat, cigar-smoking New Jersey man dropping a bag
of trash on the front stoop of a stunned Hoosier couple." Maralee Schwartz & David
Maraniss, Garbage In, Media Advisor Out, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1990, at A8. Senator Coats
backed a bill in the 101st Congress which would have authorized the state to ban the import of
out-of-state garbage. New Jersey's Senators vowed to fight it. Id.
39. "With landfill space dwindling and incinerators increasingly unpopular, states' efforts
to dispose of their industrial waste have ignited a new kind of civil war." Michael Weisskopf,
Carolinas' Clash Over Toxic Waste: Sign of a Nationwide Problem, WASH. POST, Mar. 18,
1991, at A7. After Ohio shut down a major landfill, New York threatened to stop accepting its
hazardous wastes. Ohio responded by threatening a MSW embargo of New York garbage. Id.
40. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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of the comprehensive plan, some landfilling will still be necessary. 41 A properly constructed and sited landfill minimizes the inherent danger in MSW
burial.42 Landfilling can be done safely if a state possesses both the financial
and natural resources. Unfortunately, some states may not have the necessary soil and water conditions for safe landfilling.4 a Even under the best
circumstances, therefore, some states will need to export MSW to out-ofstate sites. 44 Because improper MSW disposal can cause dangers that transgress boundary lines,4 5 it is in every state's best interest to ensure that all
MSW in the United States gets proper disposal. In other words, the MSW
disposal problem is a national problem. 46
41. "[E]ven after the municipal waste has been reduced, collected, recycled, and incinerated, at least 20 percent remains to be disposed of in landfills. Landfills are therefore a necessary part of all integrated waste-management systems." O'Leary, supra note 18, at 40. The
EPA views landfilling as the least favorable method of addressing the MSW disposal problem
according to the EPA, but feels that, "[d]espite the difficulties associated with landfills, they
will necessarily be a part of any municipal waste management system because portions of the
waste stream cannot be handled in any other way." OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/530-SW-89-072, DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE TO SOLID
WASTE MANAGEMENT 2 (1989) [hereinafter EPA, DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE]; see also EPA,
SOLID WASTE DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 19.
42. "Some experts say that well-designed landfills can be safe, provided the most noxious
hazardous wastes are handled separately, and if the landfills are properly sited and engineered
with a combination of clay and plastic liners and leachate collection systems so as not to leach
pollutants into groundwater." Luoma, supra note 4, at 88. "Landfills should not be considered a 'necessary evil.' Due to technology improvements and increased regulation, modern
landfills are more secure than ever and adverse environmental impacts can be detected and
properly addressed." EPA, DECISION-MAKERS GUIDE, supra note 41, at 2.
43. See Furr, supra note 27, at 735.
44. Long Island, New York, now ships 97.5% of its garbage to incinerators or out-of-state
landfills. Brian Donovan, Underside of LI's Garbage Crisis, NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 1991, at 6.
45. Toxic plumes can migrate more than a mile downgradient of a leaking MSW landfill.
Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,319 (1988).
46. The New Jersey Governor's Counsel for Legislation and Policy expressly stated that
the MSW disposal problem is national in scope, and that giving states the ability to restrict the
interstate flow of MSW is a "dangerously simplistic response" which will only "compound the
problem by inviting each state to determine what is best for the nation." Hearings,supra note
32, at 146 (testimony of Gregory Lawler, N.J. Governor's Counsel for Legislation and Policy).
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II.

ACTIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONCERNING
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE

Congress has taken an active role in protecting the environment.47 For
example, it has enacted legislation to protect and conserve water,48 air,4 9
land,5 ° and general human health." These efforts at pollution control have
had two goals: remedial action aimed at resolving existing hazards52 and
action to decrease the generation of waste at the source. 3 The logic behind
Congress' policy is that if the United States generates less waste, it will have
54
less pollution to clean up.

47. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988),
sets forth the policy of the federal government to consider environmental concerns when administering its programs. 42 U.S.C. § 4331. NEPA requires agencies to file environmental
impact statements whenever they make significant decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. The Act also
created the Council on Environmental Quality, a group which advises the President on environmental matters. 42 U.S.C. § 4342.
48. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988), sets limitations on pollutants discharged into United States waters
through point sources and requires dischargers to utilize certain levels of pollution control
technology along a specified timetable.
49. The Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988), protects America's air by
setting national ambient air quality standards for existing sources of pollutants, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409, and mandatory emission standards for hazardous and new sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
50. The Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988), addresses the creation, storage, transportation and disposal of hazardous waste. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988), addresses the cleanup of hazardous waste sites by encouraging rapid cleanup and heavy
liability on polluters.
51. In this regard, Congress has enacted four important statutes: the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988); the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988) (regulating chemical substances and mixtures); the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988); and the Public
Health Service Act (Safe Drinking Water Act or PHSA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988).
52. The objective of the Clean Water Act is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). CERCLA is designated entirely to clean up hazardous waste sites in America. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
53. One stated purpose of the Clean Air Act is the "prevention and control of air pollution at its source." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3). One goal of the Clean Water Act is that the
"discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
The national policy underlying RCRA is to reduce or eliminate "the generation of hazardous
waste ... as expeditiously as possible." 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b).
54. In discussing the logic behind source reduction of solid waste, the EPA has stated:
"Although the exact benefits of source reduction are difficult to quantify, the benefits are conceptually clear. For example, through the implementation of source reduction activities, landfill capacity and natural resources are conserved, less energy is used during product
manufacture, and air, water, and land pollution are reduced." EPA, DECISION-MAKERS
GUIDE, supra note 41, at 51-52. One of the objectives of RCRA is the protection of human
health and the environment by "requiring that hazardous waste be properly managed in the
first instance thereby reducing the need for corrective action at a future date." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6902(a)(5).
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A. Existing Legislation on Solid Waste
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulates solid
waste. Although it took the lead in regulating hazardous waste," the federal
government has not adequately controlled MSW disposal.56 With MSW disposal, the role of the federal government is not one of regulation, but rather
one of cooperation with state and local governments. 57 To assist these governments, the EPA has promulgated regulatory guidelines outlining the as55. For the distinction between hazardous waste and municipal solid waste, see supra note

1. Congress' goals in RCRA regarding hazardous waste are to address source reduction whenever possible. Where source reduction is not possible, hazardous waste "should be treated,
stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b).
RCRA attempts to accomplish its goals in four ways. First, the Office of Solid Waste (Office) was created within the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6911(a). The Office is headed by the Assistant
Administrator of the EPA and the duties of the Administrator (other than those concerning
research and development) are carried out through the Office. Id. Second, RCRA developed a
cradle-to-grave system of hazardous waste regulation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b. Under this
system, the states are encouraged, with EPA approval, to set up their own solid waste management plans as long as they are at least as stringent as the federal regulations. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6926-6931. Third, RCRA made the EPA responsible for promoting research on hazardous
waste management and disposal, and for providing financial and technical assistance to improve the hazardous waste situation in the United States. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6981-6987. Finally,
Congress gave the Administrator of the EPA the authority to enforce its regulations through
administrative orders and by filing civil suits for temporary or permanent injunctions. 42
U.S.C. § 6928. The Administrator may also initiate and conduct criminal investigations and
may give the results to the Attorney General for prosecution. Id. § 6912(c); CHARLES M.
CHADD & LYNN L. BERGESON, GUIDE TO AVOIDING LIABILITY FOR WASTE DISPOSAL 3-4

(1986); see also supra note 6.
56. RCRA Subtitle D is Congress' response to the MSW problem in the United States. 42
U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a.
The objectives of [Subtitle D of RCRA] are to assist in developing and encouraging
methods for the disposal of solid waste which are environmentally sound and which
maximize the utilization of valuable resources .... Such objectives are to be accomplished through Federal technical and financial assistance to States or regional authorities for comprehensive planning pursuant to Federal guidelines designed to
foster cooperation among Federal, State, and local governments and private industry.
42 U.S.C. § 6941.
Even though these federal guidelines are fairly specific see, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314-33,422
(1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258) (proposed Aug. 30, 1988) (outlining solid
waste disposal facility criteria), implementation and enforcement is left completely to the
states. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/530-SW-88-007, REPORT TO CONGRESS, EPA ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS UNDER THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT: FOURTH

QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 1986 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 1987 37 (1987).

57. For example, Subtitle D outlaws open dumps. 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a). While the EPA
sets technical criteria and guidelines for the management of MSW, enforcement of these provisions is left up to the states. 42 U.S.C. § 6941; see also supra note 56. The EPA is authorized
to offer financial and technical assistance to help the states develop solid waste management
plans. 42 U.S.C. § 6948. The Administrator of the EPA approves the plans if they comply
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pects of safe MSW disposal.5 8 Enforcement of these guidelines, however, is
left to the states. 59 Finally, under RCRA, states may develop their own
MSW management plans.' While the plans are voluntary, participating
states are eligible for federal technical and financial assistance. 6 ' Although
the problem is significant, Congress has not taken control of the problem as
it has with hazardous waste.62
B.

Proposed Legislation on Solid Waste

The 101st Congress was alive with bills addressing the MSW disposal
problem. 63 The proposed solutions ranged from broad comprehensive
plans' to specific remedies for individual problems.6 5 Some bills proposed
with the guidelines. If a plan does not comply with the guidelines, the Administrator is authorized to withdraw any funding given under Subtitle D. 42 U.S.C.

§

6947.

58. 42 U.S.C. § 6942; see also supra note 56.
59. See supra note 57.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6942-6943.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6942, 6943, 6946, 6947.
62. See Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
63. The 101st Congress introduced over 100 new bills on the subject. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, CongressSees Bumper Crop of Solid Waste Management Bills, REUSABLE NEWS,
Spring 1990, at 2 (hereinafter Bumper Crop of Bills]. In the Senate, two bills were the focus of
attention: S. 1113, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (bill by Sen. Baucus); and S. 1112, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (bill by Sen. Chafee). Bumper Crop of Bills, supra, at 2.
Senator Baucus' bill would have established a national policy focusing on source reduction
and recycling for all types of waste. It proposed national source reduction goals of 10% and
recycling goals of 25% within four years, with a goal of 50% recycling within ten years. The
bill encouraged national standards for packaging and use of recycled products. Finally, the
bill proposed new regulations on MSW incinerators, exports, and the creation of a permit
system for solid waste treatment and disposal facilities. Id.
Senator Chafee's bill, which focused on MSW source reduction and recycling, would have
established the Office of Waste Reduction within the EPA. It proposed detailed state planning
requirements, encouraged source reduction and recycling development though grants and low
interest loans, and restricted incinerator permits unless minimum service area source reduction
and recycling goals were met. Id.
The most ambitious bill in the House of Representatives was H.R. 2162, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) (bill by Rep. Luken). Bumper Crop ofBills, supra, at 2. The bill would have
established a national policy for solid waste with priority given to source reduction and recycling. It proposed tighter standards on MSW disposal and would encourage markets for
recycled products. It would grant the EPA the authority to promulgate waste reduction regulations. Finally, the bill would grant the states the authority to ban out-of-state solid waste if
they were implementing an EPA-approved solid waste management plan. Id.
64. Bumper Crop of Bills, supra note 63, at 2.
65. Some members of Congress have opted to forgo comprehensive plans in dealing with
the national waste disposal problem and focus their efforts on specific areas in need of legislation. Their proposed bills focus on the specific areas of source reduction, recycling and incinerator regulations. See, e.g., S. 1112, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (setting national goals for
MSW reduction to be achieved by the United States along a specified timetable); S. 932, 101st
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66
to authorize the states to regulate the importation of out-of-state MSW.
Still others advocated the use of regional landfills organized, financed, and
operated through interstate compacts.6 7 Although none of the bills were
passed into law before the 101st Congress adjourned, the sheer number of
proposals highlights the pressures on Congress to act.68
Moreover, as soon as the 102nd Congress assembled, Senators and Representatives renewed their efforts to pass national MSW laws. 69 As RCRA is
up for reauthorization on the congressional calendar this term, and as pressure from emotional constituents is increasing, the United States seems to be
on the verge of new and comprehensive MSW legislation. 70 To date, however, the federal government has provided the states little guidance toward

Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (requiring all beverage containers sold in the United States to carry a
minimum deposit in order to encourage recycling).
66. One way that many members of Congress address the problem is simply to give the
states the authority to deal with their own waste problems. These bills include proposals to
empower the states to ban the importation of solid waste. See, e.g., S. 1921, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) (granting states the right to ban out-of-state waste and the power to impose discriminatory tipping fee schedules that would take the economic incentive out of long distance
solid waste hauling, and requiring the states to implement a 20-year waste disposal plan similar
to the 20-year hazardous waste plan required by RCRA).
67. Several members of Congress have taken a compromise position on the solid waste
issue. They neither advocate strict federal government regulation of solid waste, nor do they
propose giving the states free reign to ban the import of out-of-state garbage. Instead, these
Congressmen propose granting the states the authority to enter into compacts with other states
to finance, construct and operate regional landfill disposal sites. See, e.g., S. 1585, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989) (bill by Sen. Bingaman); H.R. 2723, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (bill by
Reps. Kanjorski and Yatron). In general, the states would be required to submit solid waste
disposal plans to the EPA, outlining how they will dispose of all the waste produced within the
state. The states need not rely solely on their own resources, however, because they are also
granted the authority to enter into compacts with other states, as necessary.
68. "Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives ... introduced over 100
In addition, on February 26, Congress
new bills related to solid waste management ....
adopted a joint resolution declaring April 1990 'National Recycling Month.'" Bumper Crop
of Bills, supra note 63, at 2.
69. See S. 175, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (encouraging regional landfills through the
use of interstate compacts); H.R. 116, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also H.R. 755, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (promoting recycling); H.R. 300, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (same);
H.R. 231, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (same); S. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (authorizing the states to impose variable tipping fee schedules that could discriminate against out-ofstate MSW); S. 174, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (amending present MSW treatment under
RCRA to create certification requirements, impose penalties, and implement stricter requirements on sanitary landfills).
70. At the time this article went to print, the United States Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Protection of the Committee on Environment and Public Works had held a hearing
on the interstate transportation of solid waste on June 18, 1991 at which various Senators,
state politicians, and interest groups voiced proposals to amend Subtitle D of RCRA. Similarly, the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Transportation of Hazardous Materials of the Committee on Energy and Commerce had held the Interstate
Transportationof Solid Waste hearings on April 30 and May 7, 1991. Hearings,supra note 32.
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solving the MSW problem. Thus, a void continues to exist between the
problem and corrective action. Although some states have attempted to fill
the void and attack the problem themselves, the Commerce Clause erects a
hurdle that severely limits the actions a state can take. 1
III. THE

COMMERCE CLAUSE AND SOLID WASTE TRANSPORTATION

A.

The Commerce Clause and State Regulation

Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. '' 2 Although the
Constitution does not define "commerce," the United States Supreme Court
has read the term broadly, and today "commerce" covers virtually all commercial transactions.7 3 The Commerce Clause was designed to keep commerce moving freely among the states, thereby guarding against the
economic balkanization that plagued the United States under the Articles of
Confederation.7 4 The clause has been interpreted not only as a grant of
71. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that a New
Jersey ban on imported solid and liquid wastes violated the Commerce Clause).
72. U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73. As one commentator describes the scope of the Commerce Clause: "Virtually every
article of commercial activity (minnows, cantaloupes, scrap, timber, and yes, even garbage) is
considered an article of commerce ...." Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at 787.
The first Supreme Court case interpreting the Commerce Clause was Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the New York legislature gave Ogden exclusive rights to
run steamboats between New York and New Jersey. When Gibbons, who operated steamboats licensed by federal statute, ran his boats in opposition to Ogden's monopoly, Ogden
obtained an injunction from a New York court forbidding Gibbons from operating in New
York waters. Id. at 1-3. Chief Justice Marshall stated that commerce covered all "commercial
intercourse." Id. at 193. The Court held that the operation of boats between state waters was
commerce under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 229-30. This decision established that it is
Congress, not the states, that has the power to regulate interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court today shows Congress extreme deference when reviewing commercial
regulation. For example, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264 (1981), the Court considered the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. The Court applied a typically lenient standard of review: As long as there is
any rational basis for Congress' finding the regulated activity to be commerce and as long as
the means are reasonably related to achieve Congress' goals, the Court will defer to Congress.
Id. at 276.
74. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states retained the power to regulate interstate commerce, resulting in the individual states discriminating against their neighbors in
order to benefit their own citizens. THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 47
(James Madison); David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural"Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (1989). The Commerce Clause "was framed upon the theory that
the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity
and salvation are in union and not division." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523
(1934).
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power to Congress, but also, through the dormant Commerce Clause, as a
limit on state legislatures.7 5 Because Congress holds the power to regulate
6 the states are forbidden from passing laws that unduly burden
commerce,
it. 77 Thus, if a state and Congress each pass a law regulating the same area
of interstate commerce, the state law must fall. In addition, even when Congress is silent concerning an area of interstate commerce, the states do not
necessarily acquire the right to enter the field of regulation. 7' Under the
dormant Commerce Clause, the absence of congressional action opens the
door for state regulation only if there is a legitimate local purpose 79 and the
law does not overly burden interstate commerce.8 0
75. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211. "The commerce clause is a self-executing limitation on the power of the states to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on commerce between the states." Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at 787. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 138-39 (2d ed. 1983).
76. Reading the Commerce Clause broadly, Chief Justice Marshall ruled in Gibbons that
congressional authority is paramount. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197. He concluded that
"the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United
States." Id. Thus, in cases concerning interstate commerce, Congress has plenary power to
regulate.
77. Because the state court's order in Gibbons conflicted with federal law, Chief Justice
Marshall held the injunction to be invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 211. He stated that in every case in which a state and federal regulation
oppose each other, "the Act of Congress, or treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State,
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." Id. See generally
NOWAK, supra note 75, at 138-39.
78. Chief Justice Marshall considered the argument that silence by Congress did not implicitly give the power to the states. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209. The Chief Justice
declared that "[t]here is great force in this argument," but he did not explicitly decide whether
the argument was correct. Id. For discussion of the modern view of the dormant Commerce
Clause, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
79. Even though the states cannot overtly regulate interstate commerce, they are permitted to exercise their general police powers over matters within their boundaries to protect their
citizens even if the regulations have an incidental effect on interstate commerce. For example,
a state that passes a law guarding the health, safety and welfare of its residents is furthering a
legitimate local purpose, and such a law does not necessarily violate the Commerce Clause
simply becuse it affects interstate commerce. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837)
(holding that a New York statute requiring ships' reports to include information on incoming
passengers was not a regulation of interstate commerce but a legitimate exercise of police
power).
Today, the Supreme Court has found legitimate local purposes in a variety of settings, including highway and employee safety, healthful milk, air, and water, racial equality, household
privacy, and protection of natural resources. Michael E. Smith, State DiscriminationsAgainst
Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1232-33 (1986). Even though the police power
encompasses a wide spectrum of activity, the protection of the local economy is not a legitimate state purpose. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
80. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (holding that an Arizona law
that limited the number of cars on trains that passed through the state produced slight safety
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In determining the constitutionality of a state law under the dormant
Commerce Clause, the threshold question is whether the area of regulation
is indeed commerce.81 Even with the Court's expansive view of commerce,
certain transactions fail this test.8 2 However, the transportation of wastes
including MSW has been held to be commerce.8 3 After deciding that a
transaction is interstate commerce, a court looks to whether the state's regulation grants intrastate commerce preferential treatment over interstate commerce.8 4 Specifically, a court asks whether the state regulation is
discriminatory on its face or whether in application it regulates "evenhand85
edly" with only incidental effects on interstate commerce.
If the regulation is found to discriminate against interstate commerce
either facially or in practical effect, a court uses an "elevated scrutiny" analysis to test the regulation's validity.86 Under this analysis, a court considers
three issues.8 7 First, it determines whether the ends of the regulation are
legitimate.8 8 If the state can couch its regulation as a state police power, the
law will likely pass this test.8 9 Next, the court considers whether the means
chosen to implement the regulation sufficiently further the original legitimate ends for which the law was passed. 9 This means-end fit requires a
"rational relation" between the regulation and its purpose.9 1 Finally, the
benefits relative to the substantial burdens on interstate commerce and, therefore, was
unconstitutional).
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. Some transactions are so inherently undesirable, that they do not rise to the dignity of
commerce. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) (holding that transportation of diseased
cattle and horses is not commerce); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908) (holding that transportation of diseased cattle is not commerce); Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939) (holding
that transportation of dead animals is not commerce).
83. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that transportation
of garbage is commerce); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dept of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that transportation of hazardous waste is
commerce), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991); Illinois v. General Electric Co., 683 F.2d 206
(7th Cir. 1982) (holding that transportation of nuclear waste is commerce), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1983).
84. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (holding that an Arizona regulation requiring all cantaloupes sold within the state to display their state of origin was
nondiscriminatory).
85. Id.
86. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). The use of the term "elevated scrutiny" was coined by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in
Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 763 (S.D. Ind.
1990).
87. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
88. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
90. Smith, supra note 79, at 1236-37.
91. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470, 473 (1981).
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court explores whether there were any alternatives to the particular regulation that would accomplish the same ends with a lesser burden on interstate
commerce.9 2 Historically, the Supreme Court has regularly found less burdensome alternatives and thus held state regulations unconstitutional.9"
If the court finds the state regulation does not discriminate in favor of
intrastate commerce over interstate commerce, it then applies a balancing
test (hereinafter "Pike analysis" or "Pike balance") to determine whether the
statute is consistent with the Commerce Clause. 94 The court weighs the putative local benefits of the regulation against the burden it places on interstate commerce.9 5 If the court finds that furthering the local purpose
through the regulation outweighs the burden on interstate commerce, the
96
statute survives constitutional scrutiny.
B.

Solid Waste Transportation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey

The issues of interstate transportation of solid waste and the dormant
Commerce Clause collided in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey.9 7 In City of
Philadelphia,the state of New Jersey enacted a statute that banned, with a
few narrow exceptions, the import of solid or liquid waste originating
outside the state's borders.9 8 Following the traditional .Commerce Clause
analysis, the Court first analyzed whether Congress had acted in the area of
92. Smith, supra note 79, at 1235-36.
93. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (holding that city ordinance
forbidding the sale of milk within the city if the milk was pasteurized outside a five mile radius
was unconstitutional because less discriminatory alternatives were available, such as sending
out inspectors to check all incoming milk and then charging the costs to the producers).
Dean Milk remains controlling law: "'[E]ven in the exercise of its unquestioned power to
protect the health and safety of its people,' a state or locality may not discriminate against
interstate commerce 'if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.'" Smith, supra note 79, at 1237 (quoting Dean Milk, 340
U.S. at 354). The alternative must be "reasonable," which one commentator interprets to
mean "one that does not unduly impair other legitimate state interests, such as saving the
money of local taxpayers." Id. at 1237-38.
94. This balancing approach of modern courts has best summarized in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970):
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree.
Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
98. The New Jersey law provided that:
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solid waste disposal.99 After reviewing RCRA,I °° the Court found no con-

gressional intent to preempt the entire field of waste management.10 1 The
Court therefore turned to its dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
The City of Philadelphia Court next considered whether interstate transportation of garbage is commerce.'12 The New Jersey Supreme Court had
found garbage to be a valueless commodity falling outside the constitutional
protection of the Commerce Clause. 10 3 The United States Supreme Court

disagreed." °o The Court then analyzed the nature of the discrimination reNo person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which originated or
was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be fed to
swine in the State of New Jersey, until the commissioner [of the State Department of
Environmental Protection] shall determine that such action can be permitted without endangering the public health, safety and welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the treatment and disposal of such waste in this State.
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618-19 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:1 1-10 (West Supp. 1978)).
The law also empowered the State Commissioner of Environmental Protection to develop
rules banning the importation of solid wastes. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 619 n.j. The
Commissioner instituted a complete ban on all imported wastes with four narrow exceptions
for wastes that were not entering New Jersey for ultimate disposal.
(a) No person shall bring into this State, or accept for disposal in this State, any solid
or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of this
State. This Section shall not apply to:
1. Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey;
2. Any separated waste material, including newsprint, paper, glass and metals, that
is free from putrescible materials and not mixed with other solid or liquid waste that
is intended for a recycling or reclamation facility;
3. Municipal solid waste to be separated or processed into usable secondary materials, including fuel and heat, at a resource recovery facility ... ; and

4. Pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical waste, bulk liquid, bulk semi-liquid,
which is to be treated, processed or recovered in a solid waste disposal facility ....
City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 619-20 n.2 (emphasis added) (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE
Trr. 7, § 1-4.2 (Supp. 1977)).
99. 437 U.S. at 620-21 n.4.
100. Id (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et. seq. (1976)).
101. The Court found that "Congress expressly [had] provided that 'the collection and
disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and
local agencies .... .' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1976)).
102. Id at 621-23.
103. Id. at 622.
104. The City of PhiladelphiaCourt held: "All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce
Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset." Id. at 622. The Court differentiated the quarantine cases, a line of cases which held "that because the articles' worth in
interstate commerce was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very movement,
States could prohibit their transportation across state lines." Id. (citing Bowman v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888)); see also supra note 82; Smith, supra note 79, at 1247-49.
The Court found the key distinction to be that the nature of the commodities involved in the
quarantine cases was such that their very transportation was inherently dangerous to the
health of the state residents. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622, 628-29. Thus, the states
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suiting from the state regulation and questioned whether the law was a protectionist measure or a regulation founded on a legitimate local purpose with
only incidental affects on interstate commerce.' 0 5 The Court concluded that
the purpose of the statute was irrelevant; even if New Jersey had a legitimate
local purpose in enacting its regulation, the law extended beyond a mere
incidental effect on interstate commerce."o Instead, the Court determined
that the New Jersey regulation was discriminatory both facially and in effect.
Unless the state could show a reason for the discrimination against commerce other than its point of origin, the law would have to fall."° 7
Thus, under the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the City of Philadelphia Court assumed New Jersey had a legitimate purpose in enacting its
regulation. 108 The state statute still failed to satisfy the Pike analysis, however, because it discriminated overtly and not merely incidentally. 10 9 Thus,
without expressly stating the framework, the Court applied the elevated
scrutiny test. Under this analysis, the initial requirement, that of a legitimate local purpose, was again satisfied by the Court's assumption that such
a legitimate purpose existed. 0
retained the power to ban these commodities because their risk outweighed their value as
interstate commerce. Id. at 622. With solid waste, however, it is the disposal and not the
movement that arguably is inherently dangerous. Id. at 629. The Court held that the mere
classification by the New Jersey Supreme Court of solid waste as a "valueless" commodity is
not enough to deny commerce clause protection. Id. at 622-23. In short, the City of Philadelphia Court clearly held that the transportation of solid waste among the states is interstate
commerce within the definition of the Constitution. Id.; see Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7,
at 789.
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist found the quarantine cases applicable to solid waste. City
of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 631-33. He found the majority's distinction between the inherent
danger of transportation and disposal to be "pointless." Id. at 633. He found solid waste to be
a "noxious item[ ]" which the states should have the right to keep out of their borders. Id. at
632.
105. Id. at 624-29.
106. The City of PhiladelphiaCourt reasoned that "[t]his dispute about ultimate legislative
purpose need not be resolved, because its resolution would not be relevant to the constitutional
issue to be decided in this case.... [T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as
well as legislative ends." I4 at 626; see Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at 789.
107. The Court reasoned that
we assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents' pocketbooks as well as
their environment ....
But whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside
the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them
differently.
City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-27.
108. Id. at 626.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 107.
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The statute, however, did not survive the rest of the analysis. The Court
did not expressly state which remaining prong, the means-end fit or the
availability of less discriminatory alternatives, the statute failed. It appears,
however, that the latter gives the better answer. Looking at the means-end
fit in City of Philadelphia,the state's purpose of protecting the health of its
citizens by decreasing in-state dumping of solid waste was assumed to be
legitimate. 1 This goal of decreasing dumping is furthered when all imports
are banned. Thus, the means-end fit seems to be satisfied.
The critical issue in City of Philadelphia involved the availability of less
discriminatory alternatives to achieve the end of decreased in-state dumping. 112 The Court explained that New Jersey could decrease in-state dump113
ing by restricting the disposal of both in-state and out-of-state waste.
However, New Jersey chose the alternative which placed the entire burden
of protecting the state's landfills on nonresidents.' 14 Although there were
less discriminatory alternatives available (i.e., banning or reducing all dumping), New Jersey chose not to use them."' For this reason, the Court held
the statute unconstitutional.'16
Two elements of City of Philadelphia are important to note. First, the
Court implied that landfills are considered natural resources of a state." 7
The Court explained that a state cannot hoard natural resources for the benefit of its own citizens, which New Jersey appeared to be doing in City of
Philadelphia."' The Court left open, however, the possibility of a state
granting preference to its citizens in the use of a state-owned facility.' 9
111. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 625-26.
112. Id. at 626-27.
113. Id. at 626.

114. Id. at 629.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 627 & n.6.
118. Id. at 627. The basic concept of open state borders for commerce also applies to a
state's natural resources. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
Oklahoma charged a minimum wellhead price which was above the market rates for all natural gas taken from a particular field. The Court held that even though the majority of this gas
was destined to travel out-of-state, the state's interest in gas conservation outweighed the nation's interest in the free flow of commerce.
The Court has held that a state, except in times of severe shortage, cannot protect its natural
resources by offering them first to its citizens. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956
(1982) (rejecting a Nebraska regulation that banned groundwater pumping and export, unless
the importing state agreed reciprocally to allow Nebraska to pump and import water from that
state). Nor can a state demand something in return from its neighboring states in exchange for
the export of a natural resource. Id.
119. William A. Campbell, State Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: A Techniquefor Excluding Out-Of-State Wastes?, 14 ENVTL. L. 177, 184 (1983). "In footnote six...
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Second, the Court stated that the Commerce Clause is designed to keep
one state from shifting the cost of a national problem away from itself and
onto others.' 20 By spreading the cost of a problem across the nation, the
2
Commerce Clause seems inherently equitable; everybody shares equally.1 1
However, with the issue of solid waste, the Commerce Clause does little to
solve the problem. Indeed, the Commerce Clause may hinder achieving a
solution by shifting pressure to control output away from states generating
the largest amount of garbage. 22 In sum, the Commerce Clause may be
fair, but based on the message of City of Philadelphia,it hinders the ultimate
solution of the MSW problem.
C.

The Market ParticipantException

Even though the dormant Commerce Clause forbids states from imposing
regulations that block interstate economic activity, the Supreme Court has
carved out an exception to the rule. The Court has determined that when a
state "manufactures and sells its own products, provides subsidized services
to its residents, or procures its own products,"'' 23 it acts not as a market
regulator but as a "market participant."'124 This distinction allows a state to
discriminate against nonresidents, at least where Congress has remained sithe Court left open the possibility that exclusion of out-of-state hazardous wastes from state-

owned sites would be upheld." Id. (referring to City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 627 n.6).
120. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.
121. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
122. Sue Robertson of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management's Land
Division discussed the Commerce Clause's effect on Alabama's effort to comply with SARA.
She stated, "The commerce clause [sic] has provided an effective barrier to responsible waste
management States implementing SARA and a convenient escape for those States with intent
of maintaining the status quo. In other words, the commerce clause [sic] is not protecting
importing States, but rather causing their exportation." Hearings,supra note 32, at 102. However, this is exactly the way the Framers intended the Commerce Clause to operate. Long
term prosperity of the United States is contingent on all states standing on equal economic
footing. See supra note 74.
123. Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at 791.
124. The Supreme Court first announced the market participant exception in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (holding that Maryland's bounty system on
abandoned automobiles, encouraging disposal of abandoned cars within the state while imposing stricter certification requirements on nonresidents, is valid under Commerce Clause analysis, because Maryland was a market participant rather than a market regulator); see also White
v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (holding the city of
Boston to be a market participant in the construction market when it required at least one-half
of the employees of all city-funded construction projects to be city residents). Some commentators suggest that when a state acts as a market participant, rather than a market regulator, it
is basically free to function in any way it desires within its market, regardless of the impact on
interstate commerce. Compare Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at 796 with Pomper, supra
note 74, at 1320-28.
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lent on the issue."' The rationale behind this exception is that when a state
enters a market, it is using state taxpayers' funds to purchase services or
goods in the state residents' names.1 26 According to the Court, therefore, it
is only equitable to allow the state to specifically benefit its residents
who
127
paid for the services and goods over nonresidents who did not.
The market participant exception, however, is limited. A state that enters
a market must limit its effect on interstate commerce to that narrow market.1 28 If the state indirectly affects other markets farther down the stream
of commerce, a court may find that the state is effectively regulating those
markets, and it therefore would subject the regulation to traditional dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny.

129

Additionally, in the area of landfill disposal, it is important to note how
the market participant exception and the concept of hoarding natural resources relate. The Court addressed the distinction between a state acting as
a market participant and a state unconstitutionally protecting its natural resources in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake.'3 0 In Reeves, South Dakota had long operated a cement production plant from which the state supplied both in-state
125.

"Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the

absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others." Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 810 (footnote
omitted).
126. One commentator provides: "The fact that [a state] limit[s] its sales to in-state purchasers only is no more protectionist than the limitation of benefits of other activities (Ie., state
educational institutions, police and fire protection) to the persons who pay for such programs
through state treasury." Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at 794 (commenting on Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)).
127. Pomper, supra note 74, at 1320-22.
128. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (holding that
Alaska law requiring in-state processing for all timber purchased from the State regulated the
downstream processing market, a market in which Alaska did not participate, and, therefore,
Alaska was a regulator and not a participant in the timber processing market).
129. The South-Central Court held:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a State to impose
burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but allows it to
go no further. The State may not impose conditions . . . that have a substantial
regulatory effect outside of that particular market.
Id. at 97. As one commentator provides:
After South-Central Timber Development, a state, acting as a market participant,
can restrict the benefit it provides so as to favor its citizens, but cannot restrict the
private, separate economic relationships of trading partners subsequent to the market
activity in which the state was involved. Thus, a state may not avail itself of the
market participant doctrine to immunize its downstream regulation of other markets
in which it is not a participant.
Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at 801.
130. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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and out-of-state customers with cement.13 1 Over time, these nonresident
132
customers grew to rely on South Dakota as their main cement supplier.
During a period of cement shortage, South Dakota began discriminating
against out-of-state distributors by filling in-state orders first.' 33 Although a
state generally cannot hoard its natural resources, 34 the Court differentiated
an economic market from a natural resource by relying on the market participant doctrine.'3 5 The Reeves Court rejected the argument that South Dakota was protecting a natural resource by distinguishing natural resources
such as coal, timber, wild game, or minerals from "the end product of a
complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on
raw materials."'

' 36

The Commerce Clause and City of Philadelphia protect the interstate
transportation and disposal of MSW from discrimination by importing
states.137 However, the market participant exception does provide a possible
end run around the Commerce Clause if a state owns the landfill. 38 Indeed,
since City of Philadelphia,other courts have found states and municipalities
39
to be classified as market participants in the waste processing market.
IV.

STATE ACTION ON MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE

A. National versus State Action
The federal government provides little guidance to the states on how to
solve the national MSW problem. 1" Because of this lack of guidance, there
has been little action; the problem as a whole remains unsolved, and each
state is left alone to solve its own individual piece of the national dilemma.' 4 '
Therefore, although the problem as a whole has not changed, the problem
solver has. As the point of view changes from a national scope to a local
one, the goals to be achieved and the means to accomplish those goals
change accordingly.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.at 430-32.
Id.at 432.
Id.at 432-33.
Id.at 443.
Id.at 434-44.
Id.at 443-44.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1978).
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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1. Shift in the Goals
When Congress enacts legislation addressing national pollution problems,
it does so by instituting national goals. 142 Because Congress has not set national goals for the MSW disposal problem, the states are left to enact their
own agenda. When states attempt to pass laws to abate their own problem
of MSW, however, the goals invariably narrow. 43 These goals narrow further when counties and other subdivisions within the states regulate disposal
for their particular area.'" The scope of these regulations can narrow to the
point of regulations for individual disposal sites. 145
2. Shift in the Means
Along with the transformation of goals from broad to narrow comes a
corresponding transformation of means to achieve these goals. Where Congress has passed comprehensive pollution laws, it has also developed an
equally broad national system of enforcement. 46 As the states attempt to
142. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (one goal of the Clean Air Act is "to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population"); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) ("The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nations's waters."); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6902(b) ("The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United
States that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated
as expeditiously as possible.").
143. See, e.g., Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
732 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (upholding Michigan statute giving counties the
power to ban right of refusal of all out-of-county solid waste "to protect [the Michigan] public
health and [Michigan] environment") (quoting 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 641), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413
(6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 630 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-636); Government Suppliers, Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 747 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (invalidating Indiana
statute which made it more difficult for out-of-state haulers to dump within Indiana in order to
"bring a halt to the importation of out-of-state trash").
144. E.g., Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1989)
(upholding county-imposed variable rate structure charging more for importation of distant
waste and designed to preserve local landfill capacity for local residents), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1127 (1990).
145. E.g., Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th
Cir. 1987) (upholding ban on disposal of all waste originating outside a three county district
into a specific landfill in order to extend its useful life); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F.
Supp. 1204, 1204-06 (D.R.I. 1987) (upholding Rhode Island ban on the dumping of out-ofstate solid waste into a state-subsidized landfill).
146. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). The EPA has the authority to
gather information from regulated parties, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a), and the right of entry onto
hazardous waste sites. Id. The EPA also is authorized to issue compliance orders and impose
civil penalties of up to $25,000 a day for noncompliance, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), and to bring
criminal charges including fines of up to $250,000 for individuals and $1,000,000 for corporations or 15 years imprisonment. 42 U.S.C. § 6828(e). Regulations enforced by the EPA are
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control solid waste disposal, however, the means they choose to implement
their goals are not necessarily consistent with solving the national problem.14 7 In fact, some of the means used by the states are very similar to
those used by the federal government.' 4 ' Even so, others benefit only the
states implementing the regulations and do little, if anything, to solve the
national MSW problem. 149 Even if the solution were to lie in isolated state
action, however, the problem would remain unsolved because the Commerce
Clause obstructs these state regulations. 5 0
used to attain these goals. Eg., 42 U.S.C. § 6912. Although these regulations work in various
ways, they aim toward the common national goal of pollution control and abatement. See
supra note 142.
147. For example, see City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978), where
the Court stated:
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary to send
their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New Jersey claims the right to close its
borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or
necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and those
States might then claim the right to close their borders. The Commerce Clause will
protect New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts
by one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem
shared by all.

Id.
148. Compare Indiana's law with RCRA's definition of duties of waste disposal operators:
A department employee designated as a landfill inspector for a county under this
section shall monitor operations at every landfill in the county. The duties of the
landfill inspector include the following:
(1) Promoting compliance with the rules of the solid waste management board
governing landfill operations.
(2) Keeping records required by the rules of the solid waste management board or
ensuring that those records be kept.
(3) Investigating possible violations of:
(A) The rules of the solid waste management board; or
(B) Any statute;
governing landfill operation or solid waste disposal.
IND. CODE § 13-7-22-3(c) (1990).
For purposes of developing or assisting in the development of any regulation or enforcing the provisions of this chapter, any person who separates, stores, treats, transports, disposes of, or otherwise handles or has handled hazardous wastes shall, upon
the request of any officer, employee or representative of the Environmental Protection Agency .... furnish information relating to such wastes and permit such person
... access to, and to copy all records relating to such wastes.
42 U.S.C. § 6927(a).
149. For example, a total ban on the importation of waste such as the one implemented by
New Jersey may benefit New Jersey but postpone solving the national MSW problem. See City
of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.
150. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627-28.
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B. State Action and the Commerce Clause
1. FacialDiscrimination
Whenever a state institutes regulations to block the import of out-of-state
MSW, the most obvious obstacle to the regulation is the Commerce
Clause.'' According to the traditional analysis, these regulations will fit
into one of three categories of regulation: they are facially discriminatory
and subject to the elevated scrutiny standard;"5 2 they are "evenhanded" and
subject to the Pike15 3 analysis;' 54 or they are an instance of a state acting as
a market participant and thus exempt from the Commerce Clause.'
State
regulations that facially discriminate against out-of-state garbage face the
greatest challenge in court because of the clear ruling laid out in City of
56
Philadelphia.1
151. See, e.g., Waste Aid Sys., Inc. v. Citrus County, Fla., 613 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Fla.
1985) (holding that solid waste collector cannot challenge an out-of-county ban of imported
waste on equal protection and due process grounds).
152. See, e.g., Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739
(S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding hauler certification and variable tipping fee schedule to be facially
discriminatory); BFI Medical Waste, Inc. v. Whatcom Cty., 756 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wash.
1991) (holding county ban on the importation of all out-of-country medical waste was facially
discriminatory); National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding variable tipping fee schedule and mandatory consent to service of
process to be facially discriminatory).
153. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
154. See, e.g., Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding district ban on out-of-district waste evenhanded because it applied equally to
in-state and out-of-state nondistrict waste); Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, Ga., No.
90-8298, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19451 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 1991) (holding county ban on outof-county waste to be evenhanded, but an undue burden on interstate commerce); Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (holding state authorization of county-imposed bans to be evenhanded, as ban
applied to other in-state counties' waste as well as to out-of-state waste), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413
(6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 630 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-636); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding point of origin
certification requirement on all dumped waste to be evenhanded because Indiana resident
dumpers were treated substantially the same as nonresident dumpers); Omni Group Farms,
Inc. v. County of Cayuga, 766 F. Supp. 69 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding county ban on the import of all out-of-county MSW was evenhanded); County of Washington v. Casella Waste
Management, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16941 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1990) (same).
155. See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding county policy of charging nonresident dumpers a higher dumping fee than residents
constitutional because the county owned and operated the landfill, and thus was a market
participant), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp.
1204 (D.R.I. 1987) (holding state ban on dumping out-of-state waste at a state subsidized
landfill constitutional because Rhode Island acting as a market participant).
156. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see also supra notes 71121 and accompanying text.
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In Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 1" the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found three
provisions of an Indiana regulation preventing the dumping of out-of-state
solid waste in Indiana to violate the Commerce Clause.15 1 One provision
instituted a mandatory variable tipping fee schedule. 5 9 Under this provision, every out-of-state waste hauler was charged a tipping fee equal to that
of the disposal site nearest the point of origin of most of the waste in the
load." 6 The effect of this provision was to take the economic incentive out
of shipping waste long distances into Indiana.161
At the outset, the Government Suppliers court found the Indiana statute to
regulate the interstate transportation of waste, and thus to be subject to City
of Philadelphiaand Commerce Clause analysis.1 62 The court next found the
157. 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
158. Id. at 744, 770. In addition to the mandatory variable tipping fee schedule provision
(see infra notes 159-77) the court found a second provision mandating, as a precondition to
disposal, that solid waste be certified by a health officer of the exporting state as not containing
hazardous or infectious waste to be in violation of the Commerce Clause. It was found to be so
because the provision facially discriminated against interstate commerce and there were nondiscriminatory alternatives available to Indiana that could have required certification for instate MSW, as well. Id. at 774.
A third provision required the hauler of out-of-state waste to certify, under penalty of perjury, the Indiana county or, if the waste was imported, the state "in which the largest part of
the solid waste was generated." Id. (quoting IND. CODE § 13-7-22-2.7(c) (1990) (amended
1991)). This requirement, although evenhanded, was held to be unconstitutional because the
slight benefit of gathering some information on the source and composition of imported garbage was outweighed by the burden placed on out-of-state trash haulers to identify the origin
of trash that had been commingled at a transfer station. Id. at 776-79.
159. The Indiana statute provided:
Beginning January 1, 1991, a fee is imposed on the disposal or incineration of solid
waste in a final disposal facility in Indiana. Except as provided in section 6 [IC 139.5-5-6] of this chapter, the amount of the fee is as follows:
(1) For solid waste generated in Indiana, fifty cents ($0.50) a ton.
(2) For solid waste generated outside Indiana, the greater of the following:
(A) The cost per ton of disposing of solid waste, including tipping fees and
state and local government fees, in the final disposal facility that is closest to the
area in which the solid waste was generated, minus the fee actually charged for
the disposal or incineration of the solid waste by the owner or operator of the
final disposal facility in Indiana.
(B) Fifty cents ($0.50).
IND. CODE § 13-9.5-5-1(a) (1990) (amended 1991) (alteration in original).
160. 753 F. Supp. at 766.
161. "The typical East Coast landfill charge is above $100.00 per ton, while the typical
Indiana landfill charge is around $12.00 per ton." Id. at 766 n.33. "Given the significant
tipping fee assessed against almost all out-of-state trash, only economically foolish haulers
would ever bring their trash into the state. The fee provision erects a virtual economic barrier
to the importation of out-of-state trash." Id. at 769.
162. Id. at 763-66.
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tipping fee provision to be discriminatory in practical effect; therefore, the
state regulation was subject to the elevated scrutiny standard. 163 Proceeding
to the elevated scrutiny analysis, the court first considered whether Indiana
had a legitimate local purpose in the regulation. Government Suppliers argued that Indiana's motive in passing the regulation was purely the economic protection of its citizens, which is an "illegitimate state interest. ' 164
The court rejected this argument by holding that an otherwise valid statute
will not be invalidated, even if the motives were illegitimate. 16 5 Because the
regulation protected the health and welfare of Indiana residents by extending the useful life of landfills as well as by decreasing the amount of
extraordinarily dangerous wastes being dumped in the state, the court held
that the regulation had a legitimate local purpose.' 66
The court next determined whether the variable tipping fee provision sufficiently advanced the purpose for which it was enacted.' 67 The court rejected
Indiana's argument that the provision would advance the goal of health and
safety protection by generating funds for proper future waste disposal within
the state.' 68 Instead, the court determined that because the provision took
all the economic incentive out of the import of out-of-state waste, the regulation would not generate additional revenue. 169 The court did find, however,
that the statute advanced Indiana's goals in a way not argued by the state.17
The court reasoned that as fewer out-of-state haulers imported waste into
Indiana, landfill space would be saved for Indiana residents, thus reducing
the need for state waste disposal funding."v'
Even though the Indiana tipping fee provision passed the first two prongs
of the elevated scrutiny analysis, the third prong proved to be fatal. The
court found that there were less discriminatory alternatives to a variable tipping fee schedule.' 72 Referring to City of Philadelphia,the court reasoned
163. Id. at 766-67.
164. According to the two trash brokers who brought the suit:
Indiana's interest in public health and safety is a "post hoc" rationalization for the

law that did not surface until after this lawsuit was filed. The record in this case is
full of evidence to support this argument. The Governor and members of his administration made a number of statements that evince an objective of limiting, or perhaps
eliminating, the deposition of out-of-state trash in Indiana.

Id.at 767.
165. Id.at 768.
166. Id.at 769.
167. Id.
168. Id.

169. Id.
170. Id.at 769-70.
171. Id.

172. Id.at 770.
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that Indiana could have accomplished its goals of prolonging the life of Indiana landfills and reducing the amount of illegally dumped waste by charging
a uniform fee to in-state and out-of-state dumpers, thus slowing the flow of
all waste into Indiana landfills.' 73 Refusing to pass on the constitutionality
of any specific alternative, the court found that the mere possibility of less
74
discriminatory alternatives was sufficient to condemn the state regulation. 1
Facially discriminatory state regulations are common devices used to stem
the inflow of out-of-state waste. 175 As the Indiana variable tipping fee
schedule reflects, however, such regulation will likely violate the Commerce
Clause unless the state has no alternatives to accomplish the same goal with
less discrimination against interstate commerce. In response to this problem, some states have drafted regulations which treat in-state and out-ofstate garbage in the same manner, thereby subjecting the law to the more
these even-handed regulations have met
lenient Pike analysis. 176 But even
17 7
with varying degrees of success.
2.

"Evenhanded" Regulations

Some states have attempted to avoid the elevated scrutiny standard by
making no distinction between in-state and out-of-state garbage.' 7 8 Others
have attempted to fit regulations into the Pike analysis by delegating the
power of garbage regulation to counties within the state.' 79 Even though
counties and municipalities are subject to the same Commerce Clause scru173. Id.
174. Id.; see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 152.
•176. See supra note 154.
177. Compare Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dept of Natural Resources, 732
F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that Michigan county-imposed ban on out-of-county
solid waste is evenhanded and constitutional), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 630 U.S.L.W.
3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-636) with Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc.
v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that Indiana statute requiring all solid
waste dumpers to list the point of origin of the largest portion of trash in load to be dumped is
unconstitutional, though evenhanded, because the local benefit of identifying the point of origin for a plurality of a load of trash was much smaller than the burden imposed on interstate
haulers who pick up loads of solid waste at transfer stations which often mix trash from several
localities).
178. See supra note 177.
179. See Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 761 (explaining how state authorized counties to
impose restrictions on out-of-county waste); see also Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County,
Ga., No. 90-8298, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19451 (1 1th Cir. Aug. 23, 1991) (explaining how
Georgia forbade out-of-state haulers to transport across or dump within county boundaries
without prior permission of the county government).

1991)

Out Like Yesterday's Garbage

tiny as the states,' s o some courts have upheld their regulations banning all
out-of-county waste, in spite of the fact that they also necessarily ban all outof-state waste.I8 I
In Bill Kettlewell Excavating,Inc. v. Michigan Department of NaturalResources,'8 2 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan considered a Michigan statute that banned landfill operators from
accepting any out-of-county solid waste for disposal inside the county unless
the out-of-county waste was approved by the county solid waste management plan.' 8 3 The court also considered a county policy of banning the import of all out-of-county waste.' 8 4 The court held both the state statute and
the county policy to be constitutional under Commerce Clause analysis.' 5
The plaintiff, who owned a private landfill in St. Clair County, Michigan,
applied to the county commission for approval of a plan to import 1750 tons
of out-of-county solid waste per day.' 8 6 The commission rejected the plan
because of a county policy completely banning the import of out-of-county
waste.' 8 7 The plaintiff's initial argument was that by requiring out-of-state
haulers to get county approval, the state statute illegally discriminated
180. See Bill Kettlewell, 931 F.2d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying the Commerce Clause
analysis to a county-imposed ban on all imports of out-of-county MSW), cert. granted, Fort
Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 630 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan.
10, 1992) (No. 91-636).
181. See, e.g., Bill Kettlewell, 732 F. Supp. at 761.
182. 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 630 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S.
Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-636).
183. The regulations provided:
A person shall not accept for disposal solid waste or municipal solid waste incinerator ash that is not generated in the county in which the disposal area is located
unless the acceptance of solid waste or municipal solid waste incinerator ash that is
not generated in the county is explicitly authorized in the approved county solid
waste management plan.
In order for a disposal area to serve the disposal needs of another county, state, or
country, the service, including the disposal of municipal solid waste incinerator ash,
must be explicitly authorized in the approved solid waste management plan of the
receiving county. With regard to intercounty service within Michigan, the service
must also be explicitly authorized in the exporting county's solid waste management
plan.
Id. at 762 (quoting MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.413(a), 299.430(2) (West 1990)).
In Bill Kettlewell, it was impossible for an out-of-state trash hauler to get authorization to
dump because of a county policy banning all out-of-county waste from in-county disposal. 732
F. Supp. at 762.
184. 732 F. Supp. at 762.
185. Id. at 765-66.
186. Id. at 762.
187. Id.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 40:851

against interstate commerce because it shifted the cost of preserving Michigan landfills to other states.""8
Following the traditional Commerce Clause analysis, the court initially
questioned the nature of the discrimination against interstate commerce.18 9
The court held that the Michigan statute treated out-of-staters evenhandedly
compared to state residents.' 90 Finding the statute evenhanded, the court
then went on to determine whether the "practical effect" of the statute was
to discriminate against nonresidents of Michigan. 91 The Bill Kettlewell
court looked to City of Philadelphia and distinguished Michigan's statute
from New Jersey's, finding that while the New Jersey statute was an outright
ban on all waste being transported into the state, the Michigan law was not
nearly as far reaching. 19 2 The court found that Michigan did not place any
"flat prohibition against the importation of out-of-state waste into [its]
landfills."' 93
Moving into the Pike analysis, the Bill Kettlewell court next balanced the
burden placed on interstate commerce by the statute against the putative
local benefits. 94 The court found the local benefit, a comprehensive waste
disposal plan which protected the health, safety and welfare of Michigan
residents, outweighed the burden on out-of-state haulers faced in having to
be listed in a county's disposal plan-a burden which the plaintiff had not
proven to be a practical impossibility.1 95 The court thus found the Michigan
1 96
law constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that St. Clair County's absolute ban
on out-of-county waste was an unconstitutional application of the state
law. 97 Applying the Commerce Clause analysis and relying on the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service
District,9 8 the Bill Kettlewell Court found the county ban to be "evenhanded."' 99 Going next to the Pike balance, the Bill Kettlewell court found
188. Id.
189. Id. at 764-65.
190. Id. at 764. "Clearly, the requirement that importers appear in a county waste disposal

plan applies equally to Michigan counties outside of the county adopting the plan as well as to
out-of-state entities." Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 764-65.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 765.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).

199. Id. at 765-66 (referring to Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820
F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a local ordinance banning the importation of all waste
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the putative local benefit of extending the life of county landfills to outweigh
the burden on out-of-state haulers to find another county within Michigan in
which to dump."°° Thus, St. Clair's ban on out-of-county waste was found
to be a valid use of the county's police power.2 ° '
It is important to note that although Bill Kettlewell upheld a complete
county ban on out-of-county solid waste, its holding is not the rule followed
throughout a majority of states. For example, in Diamond Waste, Inc. v.
Monroe County, Georgia,2 °2 a state statute delegated the power of waste
management to the counties," 3 and Monroe County attempted to ban all
out-of-county waste. 2 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the state statute was constitutional," 5 but found the
county resolution to be unconstitutional. 2°' Even though the county ban
was evenhanded and accomplished the legitimate local goal of conserving
landfill space,20 7 when the court measured the Diamond Waste facts in the
Pike analysis, the burden on interstate commerce was found to outweigh the
putative local benefits.20 8 The court considered such factors as the cumulative burden on commerce that would occur if other counties within the state
imposed similar bans and whether there were less discriminatory alternatives
that would accomplish the same goal.2 ' The court found the burden on
interstate commerce to be more than just merely incidental and less discriminatory alternatives such as a lottery to give access to the landfill to be
available.21 °
into the city's landfill was evenhanded because out-of-state waste was treated the same as most
in-state waste).
200. Id. at 766.
201. Id.
202. No. 90-8298, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19451 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 1991).

203. The statute provides:
No person, firm, corporation, or employee of any municipality shall transport, pursuant to a contract, whether oral or otherwise, garbage, trash, waste, or refuse across
state or county boundaries for the purpose of dumping the same at a publicly or
privately owned dump, unless permission is first obtained from the governing authority of the county in which the dump is located and from the governing authority of

the county in which the garbage, trash, waste, or refuse is collected.
Id. at *3 n.l (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-16 (Michie 1987)).
204. The Monroe County Board of Commissioners passed a resolution to "prevent garbage, trash, or waste of any kind from being transported into Monroe County from other
counties and locations." Id. at *3.
205. Id. at *IS.
206. Id. at *9.
207. Id.
208. Id at *9-16.

209. Id. at *9-14.
210. Id. at *9-13.
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The distinguishing feature between Bill Kettlewell and Diamond Waste is
how the two courts weighed the facts of each case in the Pike analysis. On a
national scale, the significance of these two cases is relatively small. There
are many other cases across the country applying different facts and statutes
that arrive at a variety of conclusions.2 1' Bill Kettlewell and Diamond,however, serve to illustrate the type of inconsistencies in the courts with which
21 2
the states, as well as participants in the MSW business, must contend.
3.

The Market ParticipantException

One way of surviving Commerce Clause scrutiny is to avoid it altogether
by qualifying for the market participant exception.21 3 Indeed, the Court left
this window open for solid waste disposal regulations in City of Philadelphia.214 For example, in Lefrancois v. Rhode Island,215 Rhode Island subsidized the only remaining landfill in the state and imposed criminal penalties
upon anyone caught dumping out-of-state waste into the landfill.21 6
Lefrancois, a commercial waste hauler who dealt in out-of-county waste,
argued that the regulation's effect was to "erect a complete barrier to the
disposal of out-of-state solid waste in Rhode Island, '' 2 7 the kind of regulation that was forbidden in City of Philadelphia. The court agreed and stated
28
that both statutes effectively closed the state's borders. ,
The Lefrancois court distinguished City of Philadelphia,however, by applying the market participant exception.2" 9 The United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island found garbage processing to be a
211. See cases cited supra notes 152-54.
212. When this article went to print, the United States Supreme Court had granted certio-

rari on Bill Kettlewell, to be argued on Mar. 23, 1992. Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Dep't of Natural Resources, 60 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-636). The Court
should decide the issue of whether a state may give its counties the power to ban the import of
all out-of-county MSW and whether counties may, in fact, impose such a ban without violating
the Commerce Clause.
213. See cases cited supra note 155 and accompanying text.
214. See cases cited supra note 119.
215. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
216. Id. at 1205.
217. Id. at 1207.
218. Id. at 1208.

219. Id.at 1208-12.
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market activity,22 ° distinct from the natural resource of landfill sites. 22 1
Even though the only operating landfill in Rhode Island was state-owned,
the statute did not preclude nonresident haulers from buying land in Rhode
Island and operating their own landfills.2 22 Thus, the court held that the
state did not hoard the natural resource of landfill sites. 2 23 While the state
regulation in City of Philadelphiaprohibited out-of-staters from purchasing
landfill space within the state, the Rhode Island statute left that option open
for nonresidents.22 4 In sum, because Rhode Island entered a market using
the state taxpayers' money and did not preclude nonresidents from also entering that market, the state statute was exempt from Commerce Clause
scrutiny.22 5
Some commentators argue that Lefrancois permits states to completely
circumvent City of Philadelphiaby operating all in-state disposal sites themselves and regulating the MSW field so strictly that nonresidents cannot
build and operate in-state sites economically.2 26 If other states begin to circumvent City of Philadelphiathrough the market participant exception, the
result would be the closing off of state borders. States would be limited to
using their own resources in handling MSW disposal-an outcome that
would not solve the national MSW disposal problem.22 7
220. Some commentators interpret the court's position as holding that publicly-operated
landfills and other disposal services are not natural resources, but rather are sets of complicated activities that states and municipalities can control without violating the commerce
clause, as long as private operators are free to enter the same markets. Kovacs & Anderson,
supra note 7, at 797.
221. The court found that the county did not participate in the waste market because it
neither sold nor bought waste. Rather, by performing the services of collecting, compacting
and disposing of the waste in compliance with applicable health laws, the county had participated in the landfill services market. 669 F. Supp. at 1211 (quoting County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 19 (1984)).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1211-12.
224. Id. at 1212.
225. Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at 799-800.
226. Some commentators are critical of the Lefrancois court's attempt to define garbage
processing as something other than a natural resource. Kovacs & Anderson, supra note 7, at
810-13. Kovacs and Anderson argue that the area of landfill services is very closely regulated.
A state's ability to strictly regulate the opening and operation of landfills allows it to effectively
keep out-of-state residents from opening their own landfills within the state. Therefore, even
though the Rhode Island statute technically keeps this option open for nonresidents, in reality
it will be impossible for them to purchase land and operate their own landfills, and thus "the
difference between the landfill (the natural resource) and the provision of landfill services does
not exist." Id. at 813. According to this view, the gate is open to circumvent City of Philadelphia by owning or subsidizing landfills, and then limiting access to state residents under the
market participation doctrine.
227. Not all states have the resources to handle all the wastes they generate. Furr, supra
note 27, at 735.
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SOLUTION

A. Safely Disposing of MSW Nationwide
It is no longer a question of how long the United States can avoid the
MSW problem, but rather how quickly and effectively the country can equitably solve the problem. Inappropriately located and improperly managed
landfills are poisoning communities across the country.2 2 While many existing landfills are being closed,229 few new facilities are opening to accommodate the ever increasing volume of garbage.2 3 According to the EPA,
neither state regulations nor the implementation of federal guidelines is adequately protecting human health or the environment.2 3
The EPA's answer to the MSW problem is a comprehensive four part plan
that includes source reduction, recycling, incineration and landfilling.2 32
This plan is designed to be flexible to best utilize a locality's natural resources, including the requisite proper landfill cites. 233 Unfortunately, some
states either do not presently have sufficient land disposal sites or will not
have such cites in the near future.234 These states will therefore be required
to export some of their waste out-of-state. To fully protect the human health
and environment of the United States, these states must have access to outof-state dumpsites.
The Commerce Clause presently gives these surplus waste generating
states the right to access out-of-state dumpsites. 235 Even so, there is a growing movement among the importing states to restrict that access.2 36
Although Congress has the power to authorize states to ban importation of
out-of-state waste,2 37 pollutants can easily cross state boundary lines and
spread the generating state's problem to its neighbor because of the nature of
improper MSW land disposal. 238 The solution to the MSW crisis thus must
include all states.
Traditionally, when Congress has addressed national pollution problems,
it has set uniform national goals and has enacted laws to achieve these
228. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
See supra note

3-4 and accompanying text.
27 and accompanying text.
9 and accompanying text.
15 and accompanying text.
15 and accompanying text.

234. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
235.
236.
237.
238.

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1978).
See cases cited supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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goals.23 9 MSW disposal is one such national problem. 2" The EPA has
passed guidelines for MSW disposal, but enforcement of these guidelines is
left to the states.2 4' The present system is not working; something more
needs to be done.
It is only through congressional action that the problem can be solved.
Although various bills designed to solve the MSW problem were proposed
during the 101st Congress and are currently proposed in the 102nd Congress, 242 to date none have been passed into law. The EPA is presently in
the best position to study the nationwide MSW problem and to promulgate
regulations. 43 In order to bring the necessary national uniformity to the
MSW crisis, Congress should give the EPA the authority, as it has in addressing other problems, to promulgate mandatory national MSW regulations."' These regulations could easily incorporate the EPA's present
proposed four part comprehensive plan. Mandatory compliance would force
the states to safely and uniformly dispose of MSW. However, there is one
aspect of the problem that the EPA fails to consider: some states are quickly
running out of landfill space and will need to find out-of-state disposal sites.
Accordingly, Congress should authorize and encourage the formation of interstate compacts among the states.
239. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 46; cf infra note 247 (discussing the use of interstate compacts to solve
nationwide problems).
241. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. Several bills were proposed which set
guidelines for specific areas of the national MSW problem, but they do not go far enough.
These bills addressed areas such as recycling programs and incinerator management. Id. The
necessity of such regulation must not be underestimated, for recycling and incineration are
both critical elements to a comprehensive waste management system. See DiChristina, supra
note 3, at 58. However, these bills do not solve the problem of where to put all the MSW
because landfill dumping is required with even the most efficient disposal systems. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text. The ultimate solution to the national problem is a uniform
national policy coupled with state cooperation.
243. The EPA has had significant experience confronting various other nationwide pollution problems such as hazardous waste, water and air pollution. See supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6912 (authorizing the Administrator of the EPA to
promulgate regulations necessary to carry out the goals of the statute).
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B. Interstate Compacts: A Possible Answer to the Interstate
Transportationof Municipal Solid Waste

1. Formation of Interstate Compacts
An interstate compact is an agreement among states used for the purpose
of solving a shared problem.245 The Constitution and RCRA expressly give
states the right to enter into such agreements with the consent of Congress.246 States have used interstate compacts since early in our history to
solve problems that go beyond state boundaries,2 47 and the Court has inter24 8
preted them to be legally binding contracts.
Interstate compacts are the most effective device available to states seeking to bring uniformity to a region.2 49 They create common procedures and
245. Kevin J. Heron, The Interstate Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action
to Congressionally Coerced Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 4 (1985).
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ....
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power ....
); 42
U.S.C. § 6904(b) ("The consent of the Congress is hereby given to two or more States to
negotiate and enter into agreements or compacts . . . for (1) cooperative effort and mutual
assistance for the management of solid waste .... ").
247. PAUL T. HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND 3-4 (1982). When
two or more states share a problem, it is especially difficult to resolve. One reason for the
difficulty is what one commentator deems the "spillover effect." Dale D. Goble, The Compact
Clause and TransboundaryProblems: "A Federal Remedy for the Disease Most Incident to a
FederalGovernment", 17 ENVTL. L. 785, 787 (1987). "Because of their geographically limited
political responsibility, states are unlikely to restrict the conduct of their citizens to benefit the
citizens of another state. Out-of-state individuals cannot make their preferences known
through the local political market." Id. However, interstate compacts can be an effective
means to better solve the MSW disposal problem. See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying
text.
Another force working against states when they share the same resources is the "tragedy of
the commons." George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law: Trends in State Legislation, 9 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 287, 287 (1990) (referring to Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in
POLLUTION, RESOURCES, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (Alain C. Enthoven & A. Myrick Freeman III eds., 1973)). According to Sherk, a "tragedy of the commons" occurs when "[t]he
economic interest of the individual would best be served by maximizing individual use before
other individuals, acting in a similar manner, have depleted the shared resource." Id.
248. Interstate compacts are the "most binding and effective means of achieving legal cooperation between the states." HARDY, supra note 247, at 3; see Texas v. New Mexico, 107 S. Ct.
2279, 2284 (1987) (holding that the Pecos River Compact, an agreement allocating water between the states, was a contract which New Mexico had breached). See generally Charlotte
Benson Crossland, Note, "Breach" of an Interstate Compact: Texas v. New Mexico, 28 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 849 (1988).
249. As one commentator describes the usefulness of interstate compacts, "[t]he compact
clause provides a formal mechanism for states to remove the [jurisdictional] fences between
themselves and create an area of interstate uniformity that reduces the jurisdictional component of a transboundary problem." Goble, supra note 247, at 788; see also FREDRICK L. ZIMMERMAN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 41
(1976).
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standards as well as common interpretation of the rules they establish.25 °
Interstate compacts can be especially useful when addressing politically controversial issues.2 51 While the procedure for creating a compact varies,
states typically form a "joint compact commission" to negotiate and draft
the terms of an agreement.25 2 The enactment of a compact by one state
functions as an offer that other member states may accept by enacting identical statutes.25 3 Once ratified, the compact may not be modified without the
signatory states' unanimous consent.2 54
Following ratification, the compact must gain the consent of Congress.2 55
The purpose of congressional consent is to ensure that the states do not encroach upon federal authority, laws or interests. 2 56 Congress, in acting to
protect the national interest, maintains the right to attach conditions to the
proposed compact. 225" Moreover, Congress reserves the right to participate
in the compact negotiations and operations.2 58 The advantages of congressional involvement in a regional compact include the increased likelihood
and speed2 of consent, 25' as well as a balancing of regional and national
interests.

250. According to Globe:
A compact creates this area of uniformity in two ways. First, the process of political
adjustment required to negotiate a compact allows the parties to specify decision
making procedures and standards; in effect, to adopt a uniform law applicable to the
particular problem.... In addition, the formalization of the compact ensures that
these standards and procedures will be uniformly interpreted ....
Goble, supra note 247, at 788-89.
251. See James P. Hill, The Great Lakes Quasi Compact: An Emerging Paradigm for Regional Governance of US. Water Resources?, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 1 (1989).
252. Heron, supra note 245, at 9. The modern trend, however, is the use of "extra-legal
organizations composed of various state officials" with a common desire to solve an interstate
problem. These state officials draft a "compact," which is in turn enacted by state statute. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 12.
255. Id
256. Id
257. Id at 15.
258. Id.at 17-18.
259. Id.at 18.
260. As one commentator views federal involvement with interstate compacts:
By combining the efforts of two or more states and the EPA, the interstate agency
may draw on the technological and creative resources of these several governmental
bodies. Such a variety of resources helps insure that the agency has available to it the
most current information and planning techniques. The interstate agency, representing local, regional, state and national interests, is more likely to balance effectively
state and regional environmental and quality of life interests with local development
interests. The agency would thereby remove the burden of balancing such interests
from local officials ill-equipped to handle it. It also would provide local officials with
a political scapegoat when they sacrifice local development interests to compelling
state or regional environmental interests.
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2. Past Uses for Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts have proven useful in confronting a variety of re-

gional problems.2 6 1 One common regional issue that has been successfully
governed by interstate compacts is water regulation. An example is the 1983
Chesapeake Bay Agreement to establish the Chesapeake Executive Council
and eliminate pollution in the Chesapeake Bay which was signed by Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbua, and the EPA.26 2
3. Interstate Compacts and Municipal Solid Waste Disposal
Interstate compacts are particularly appropriate mechanisms to confront
the MSW crisis. 26 3 Because MSW disposal is an extremely emotional issue,
tension among the states interferes with attempts to reach disposal agreements. 26 If states are allowed to cooperate and do their own balancing of
costs and benefits, mutually beneficial agreements will more likely be
reached.26 5 Interstate compacts can provide the needed forum where exPaul D. Barker, Jr., Note, The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act: The Problem With State
Land Regulation of Interstate Resources, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 770 (1990).
261. Nuclear waste disposal, fisheries, transportation, and environmental protection are
some areas that do benefit from regulation by interstate compacts. See Hill, supra note 251, at

2.
262. See Barker, supra note 260, at 745. The EPA and the States agreed to "share the
responsibility for management decisions and resources regarding the high priority issues of the
Chesapeake Bay." Id. at 745 n.69. The group established an oversight council to protect
water quality and resources, implemented a committee to coordinate technical matters and
development plans, and opened a liaison office to advise and support the group. Id.
263. Indeed, under RCRA, states already have the authority to enter into regional compacts with the consent of Congress and the Administrator of the EPA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6904(b). Such compacts would establish agencies to manage the solid waste of two or more
states. Id. To date, no interstate MSW compacts have been approved or negotiated. On August 18, 1991, however Indiana governor Evan Bayh and New Jersey governor James Florio
signed an interstate agreement which would restrict the amount of illegal MSW flowing from
New Jersey to Indiana by the exchange of information, by allowing Indiana to take part in
New Jersey border inspections, and by developing uniform training for enforcement personnel.
Steven Lee Myers, New Jersey and IndianaAct on Trash, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1991, at B1.
264. See supra note 38.
265. One commentator, describing the benefits of interstate compacts for the regulation of
hazardous wastes, has stated:
By their nature, import restrictions under compacts would probably involve an exchange of risks and benefits between participating states. It is clear that under a
compact, states could agree to accept certain classes of wastes for disposal in exchange for the right to export other wastes to sites in surrounding states. This intracompact exchange of wastes, over reasonable distances, could result in a costeffective and risk-equitable disposal system.
Jonathan T. Cain, Routes and Roadblocks: State Controls on Hazardous Waste Imports, 23
NAT. RESOURCES J. 767, 784-85 (Oct. 1983).
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porting and importing states can negotiate the liabilities and benefits of
MSW disposal.266
In addition, interstate compacts can help ensure that states needing to
export MSW out-of-state will maintain access to safe disposal sites. While
the Commerce Clause is designed to keep state borders open, MSW importing states have circumvented Commerce Clause requirements.2 67 Moreover,
the Commerce Clause does little to pressure exporting states to reduce waste
generation. 268 By using interstate compacts, importing states could pressure
exporting states to reduce waste generation, and this pressure could be tempered or increased by Congress' power of consent.26 9 Thus, the federal government should act as a catalyst to agreement, encouraging states to pool
their landfill resources with the greatest benefit to the country as a whole.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States generates more MSW than any other country in the
world. To date, the federal government has done little to address this national problem. The states have attempted to bridge the gap, but the Commerce Clause restricts their ability to solve the problem. Presently, the
states have their hands tied, and only Congress has the power to untie them.
Congress should create national MSW disposal regulations to ensure that
the waste America generates is disposed of safely. These regulations must be
implemented as faithfully and efficiently as possible. This can be best
achieved by state cooperation through interstate compacts.
Michael R. Harpring

266. Presently, there is no such forum. Indeed, as evidenced by Senator Coats's campaign
ad, emotions are presently running so high that little can be accomplished. See supra note 38.
The states of Indiana and New Jersey recently entered into an interstate MSW agreement; the
effectiveness of such an agreement, however, is yet to be tested. See supra note 262.
267. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 155 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., supra note 122 and accompanying text.
269. Some argue that interstate MSW compacts are no better than regional compacts because they provide limited flexibility in allowing changes of membership. Hearings,supra note
32, at 82 (statement of Don Clay, Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, EPA). However, Congress may condition its consent on the inclusion of incentives
which would encourage cooperation between the states and flexibility in the compact.

